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In this paper, I raise an objection to Philip Goff’s “Revelation
Thesis” as articulated in his Consciousness and Fundamental Re-
ality (Goff, 2017). In Section 1 I present the Revelation Thesis
in the context of Goff’s broader defence of pan-psychism. In
Section 2 I argue that the Revelation Thesis entails the identity
of indiscriminable phenomenal properties. In Section 3 I argue
that the identity of indiscriminable phenomenal properties is
false. The upshot is that the Revelation Thesis is false.
1 Goff’s Revelation Thesis
1.1 The Role of the Revelation Thesis in Goff’s Program
Central to Philip Goff’s case against physicalism is what he calls the Direct
Phenomenal Transparency Thesis. There are two components to this thesis:
transparency, and direct phenomenal concepts. I summarize each in turn.
*Forthcoming in Synthese please cite final draft
†Thanks to Murat Aydede and two anonymous reviewers for helpful feedback on earlier
drafts of this article.
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Transparency in general is a feature of certain concepts; “A transparent
concept reveals what it is for its referent to exist” (Goff, 2017, p.97). Al-
ternatively, “when thinking a transparent thought, one grasps what one is
conceiving of, metaphysically speaking” (Goff, 2017, p.99). The idea here
is that in possessing a transparent concept, the concept user grasps the
essence of what it is for the concept to be instantiated. An example of a
transparent concept in Goff’s sense is a triangle. Anyone possessing the
concept of a triangle can deduce that for there to be a triangle is for there to
be a three-sided, two-dimensional figure. An example of an opaque concept
(one that is not transparent) is water. One cannot simply deduce that for
there to be water is for there to be H2O. Goff further distinguishes between
mildly and radically opaque concepts. A radically opaque concept reveals
no significant properties of its referent, whereas a mildly opaque concept
reveals significant accidental properties of its referent.
Turning now to the direct phenomenal component of the thesis, the key
idea is that of direct phenomenal concept. Introduced by David Chalmers,
a direct phenomenal concept is one formed on the basis of attending to
phenomenal experience: “Direct phenomenal concepts are based in acts of
attention to instances of phenomenal qualities” (Chalmers, 2003, p. 236).
Goff defines them in terms of conscious states: “a direct phenomenal con-
cept is a phenomenal concept of a conscious state the content of which is
wholly based on attending to that state” (Goff, 2017, p.107).
On accounts like Goff’s and Chalmers’, direct phenomenal concepts
are intended to provide a bridge between conscious experience and beliefs
formed on the basis of conscious experience. “The content of a phenomenal
concept and a corresponding phenomenal belief is partly constituted by an
underlying phenomenal quality, in that the content will mirror the quality
(picking out instances of the quality in all epistemic possibilities), and in
that across a wide range of nearby conceptually possible cases in which the
underlying quality is varied while background properties are held constant,
the content will co-vary to mirror the quality. Let us call this sort of phe-
nomenal concept a direct phenomenal concept” (Chalmers, 2003, p. 235). In
this sense, the content of a direct phenomenal concept (and the content of a
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resulting phenomenal belief), is determined by phenomenal experience. As
Chalmers describes it, in forming a direct phenomenal concept, the quality
of experience that is being attended to is “taken up” into the concept.
Another feature of direct phenomenal concepts is that they “can be
very fine-grained, picking out a very specific phenomenal quality (a highly
specific shade of phenomenal redness, for example). Standing phenomenal
concepts are usually more coarse-grained, picking out less specific qualities”
(Chalmers, 2003, p.239). For example, the phenomenal concept of redness is
a coarse-grained, standing phenomenal concept. The phenomenal concept
of the particular hue/shade/tint of redness I form when I attend to my visual
experience of the red bow on this gift basket in front of me just now is a
fine-grained, direct phenomenal concept.
Putting this all together, the Direct Phenomenal Transparency Thesis
is the claim that direct phenomenal concepts are transparent; they reveal
what it is for their referent to exist. In attending to one’s pain, for example,
one forms a direct phenomenal concept of being in that particular state of
pain. That concept, Goff claims, reveals what it is for pain of that sort to be
instantiated.
Goff notes that Chalmers’ famous two-dimensional argument against
physicalism presumes that there are no radically opaque concepts. This
is, he observes, a contentious presumption. As such, it leaves Chalmers’
argument vulnerable. By allowing that there might be radically opaque
concepts, but restricting his claims of transparency to direct phenomenal
concepts, Goff crafts an argument against physicalism that is much more
resistant to critique. The details of this argument are beyond the scope
of this paper. What is important for my purpose here is to note that the
direct phenomenal transparency thesis is a crucial premise in Goff’s ar-
gument against physicalism, which in turn is a crucial preliminary step
in defending pan-psychism. Indeed, as Goff says, “without phenomenal
transparency, the epistemic gap between the physical and the experiential
has no metaphysical significance” (Goff, 2017, p.17).
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1.2 The Exposition of the Revelation Thesis
Goff’s approach to defending the direct phenomenal transparency thesis
is indirect. He notes that it is entailed by another thesis, the revelation
thesis. The revelation thesis builds on the discussion of direct phenomenal
concepts. He claims, “In having a direct phenomenal concept, the token
conscious state being attended to is directly presented to the concept user, in
such a way that (i) the complete nature of the type to which it belongs is
apparent to the concept user, and (ii) the concept user knows with certainty
(or something close to it) that the token conscious state exists (as a token of
that type)” (Goff, 2017, p. 107). Note that the claim has two conjuncts. The
second conjunct claims that the token conscious state that the concept user
is attending to belongs to a delimitable type, and the concept user knowing
with certainty that it belongs to that type. The first conjunct claims that the
complete nature of the type is apparent to the concept user. Presumably,
the types referenced here identify phenomenal properties, and the tokens
identify particular instantiations of those properties.
Since Goff describes his revelation thesis as underwriting comparisons
between phenomenal experiences, the “complete nature” of such a direct
phenomenal concept type evidently includes at least facts about relations
that hold between it and other such types. For example, he describes a piece
of abstract art that features a large orange patch that fills the left side of a
viewer’s field of vision, and a large red patch that fills the right side of the
viewer’s field of vision. He then asks his reader to consider an introspective
judgement that the viewer of the painting might make based on attending
to her experience–that she is currently having two similar experiences. “In
grasping the nature of each aspect of experience–the aspect representing the
red splodge and the aspect representing the orange splodge–I grasp that
they have similar natures” (Goff, 2017, p. 112-113).
Goff distinguishes two variants of the revelation thesis:
Full Revelation— In having a direct phenomenal concept of
token conscious state C, C is directly presented to the concept
user, in such a way that (i) the complete nature of the type to
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which C belongs is apparent to the concept user, and (ii) the
concept user knows with rational certainty (or something close
to it) that C exists.
Partial Revelation— In having a direct phenomenal concept of
conscious state C, some aspect A of C is directly presented to the
concept user, in such a way that (i) the complete nature of the
type to which A belongs is apparent to the concept user, and (ii)
the concept user knows with rational certainty (or something
close to it) that A exists. (Goff, 2017, p.120).
Goff eschews the partial revelation reading in favour of the full revela-
tion reading. That is, what is apparent to the user is not simply the complete
nature of the type to which some aspect of her conscious state belongs. Rather,
what is apparent to the user is the complete nature of the type to which her
conscious state itself belongs.
I take Goff’s discussion of direct phenomenal concepts to include a pair
of implicit commitments. First, on his account, we employ direct phe-
nomenal concepts whenever we make introspective judgements about our
phenomenal experience. More specifically, we employ them with respect
to our experiences of colour, as in his example of the abstract art described
above. He gives this as an example of the sort of introspective judge-
ment that he claims we are “super-justified” in believing. Further, note
the role that direct phenomenal concepts play in his explanation for this
super-justification, namely the revelation thesis. Second, on his account,
each direct phenomenal concept belongs to a unique type. Note his use
of the definite article “the type” in his formulation of the revelation thesis.
This is very puzzling. Phenomenal types are often nested; instantiations
of phenomenal fire-engine red are also instantiations of phenomenal red.1
Perhaps what Goff has in mind here is that direct phenomenal concepts
are maximally specific, and the unique type is that maximally specific type.
Otherwise, I am not sure how to understand this assumption of uniqueness
of type with respect to direct phenomenal concepts. If this is all correct,
1Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this sort of example.
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Goff’s view of direct phenomenal concepts differs importantly from that of
Chalmers. Whereas Chalmers notes that direct phenomenal concepts can be
fine-grained, it appears that on Goff’s account they always are fine-grained,
and maximally so. While these are not trivial commitments, I will grant
them for the sake of the arguments in what follows.
1.3 Defense
Goff’s full revelation thesis, then, is a rather strong claim. What defence
does he offer? He employs two strategies in defending the thesis. The first
is to suggest it has strong intuitive appeal. He asks his reader to meditate
on the following informal alternative expression of the thesis:
Surely you know exactly what your pain is–what it is for some-
one to feel pained in precisely that way–just by attending to pain
and thinking about it in terms of how it feels. There is nothing
in any way hidden from you about the reality of how you’re
feeling; nor is it possible that you’re not really feeling that way.
And that’s because the feeling is ’right there’ for you, in such a
way that its reality cannot be doubted (Goff, 2017, p.108).
Maybe the idea here is that we are supposed to see that the thesis is
self-evident?
Sensing, perhaps, that this line of defence is unlikely to be very per-
suasive, Goff also offers his revelation thesis as an inference to the best
explanation for what he calls super-justification. Super-justification is “the
claim that in general the degree of confidence it is permissible to have with
regards to mathematical and introspective beliefs is much higher than the
degree of confidence it is permissible to have with regards to perceptual be-
liefs, and that the degree of confidence it is permissible to have with regards
to introspective and mathematical beliefs is roughly similar” (Goff, 2017,
p.112). Having described super-justification, and claiming that it is a sur-
prising fact in need of an explanation, Goff then claims that his revelation
thesis is the best explanation for super-justification.2
2One concern that might be raised here is that Goff does not seem to have considered
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2 Implications of the Revelation Thesis
In this section I draw out some implications of the Revelation Thesis. My
strategy will then be to argue in Section 3 that the implications are false,
thereby showing that the revelation thesis is false as well. Note, though,
that if it turns out that the revelation thesis is false, it does not follow that the
direct phenomenal transparency thesis is false. However, if it turns out that
the revelation thesis is false, then the direct phenomenal transparency thesis
loses the support Goff provides for it, and is perhaps left unmotivated.
2.1 Identity of Indiscriminable Phenomenal Properties
Goff’s Revelation Thesis entails what I will call the Identity of Indiscrim-
inable Phenomenal Properties (IIPP). Central to this thesis is the notion of
indiscriminability. The sense I have in mind here is that of Williamson: “to
discriminate between x and y is to know that they are different” (Williamson,
1994, p.238). If, upon attending to x and y, a subject S knows they are differ-
ent, then they are discriminable for her. Conversely, if, upon attending to x
and y, S does not know they are different, then they are indiscriminable for
her.3 With this notion of indiscriminability in hand, I can now define IIPP:
IIPP If, in forming direct phenomenal concepts, a concept user attends to
separate aspects of her experience, and finds them type-indiscriminable,
then those aspects belong to the same phenomenal type.
Note that sameness of phenomenal type here should be understood in
terms of numerical identity. Further, recall that on Goff’s treatment of direct
phenomenal concepts the phenomenal types in question here are not those
any other explanations. A famous objection to the procedure of inference to the best
explanation is that in this sort of inference we may just be choosing “the best of a bad lot”
(Van Fraassen, 1989, p.143). Surely if anyone is susceptible to this sort of objection, it is the
person considering just one explanation.
3I acknowledge that “indiscriminability” ordinarily carries a modal connotation: ie.
being able to discriminate. However, since the revelation thesis claims that the concept user
has certain knowledge with respect to which phenomenal properties are being instantiated
in the conscious state to which she is attending, this simpler version will suffice.
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delimited by coarse-grained standing phenomenal concepts. Rather, they
are those delimited by maximally specific, fine-grained direct phenomenal
concepts. That is, they refer to maximally specific, fine-grained phenomenal
properties.
To illustrate how a concept user might find separate aspects of her con-
scious experience to be type-indiscriminable, consider a variant of Goff’s
example of the painting with orange and red splodges. Suppose the subject
is seeing a splodge of red in the left side of her field of vision, and seeing an-
other splodge of red in the right side of her field of vision. Further suppose
that the subject forms two direct phenomenal concepts with respect to these
splodges. Call the direct phenomenal concept representing the phenomenal
property the user is attending to in the left side of her field of vision DPCL,
and the direct phenomenal concept representing the phenomenal property
the user is attending to in the right side of her field of vision DPCR. She
attends to these two phenomenal properties, and (by means of forming the
direct phenomenal concepts) knows everything there is to know about the
phenomenal type to which belong. IIPP is the claim that if the user does
not know they belong to different phenomenal types, then they belong to
the same exact, fine-grained phenomenal type.
I maintain that the revelation thesis entails IIPP. Suppose the revelation
thesis is true. Further, suppose DPCL represents a different phenomenal
type than does DPCR. By the first conjunct of the Revelation thesis, the
complete natures of the phenomenal types represented by DCPL and DCPR
are apparent to the user. Furthermore, by the second conjunct, the concept
user knows with certainty that the phenomenal quality she is attending to
in the left side of her field of vision exists as a token of the type represented
by DPCL, and that the phenomenal quality she is attending to in the right
side of her field of vision exists as a token of the type represented by DPCR.
Since identity facts are part of the complete natures of things, the concept
user is in possession of all the identity facts regarding the phenomenal types
represented by DPCL and DPCR. Therefore, the user knows with certainty
that the phenomenal property represented by DPCL is of a different type
than that represented by DPCL. Thus, if DPCL represents a different type
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than does DPCR, then the user knows with certainty that the phenomenal
quality she is attending to in the left side of her field of vision is of a
different type than the phenomenal quality she is attending to in the right
side of her field of vision. Thus, the two aspects are type-discriminable. By
contraposition, then, if in forming direct phenomenal concepts, a concept
user attends to separate aspects of her experience, and finds them type-
indiscriminable, then those aspects belong to the same phenomenal type.
Thus, the revelation thesis entails IIPP.
A corollary of IIPP is that there are no type-indiscriminable differences
between direct phenomenal concepts. For reductio, suppose there was.
That is, DPCL represents a different phenomenal type than does DPCR, but
the concept user is unaware that they represent different types. By IIPP
and the second conjunct of the previous sentence, then DPCL and DCPR
represent the same type, a contradiction.
Another closely related consequence of RT is that direct phenomenal
concepts do not admit of borderline cases. A borderline case, let us say, is
one in which there is uncertainty whether a particular token phenomenal
property belongs to one type rather than another. Suppose there were
borderline cases. Then an agent would be uncertain whether a particular
experience belonged to one type rather than another. But that contradicts
the second conjunct of RT. Thus, RT implies that there are no borderline
cases with respect to direct phenomenal concepts.
3 Argument Against IIPP
3.1 Pairwise Colour Discrimination
Goff takes it that introspective judgements between our conscious states are
among the least contentious examples of super-justification. It was for this
reason he chose the example of comparing the orange and red splodges. In
this section, I will focus on exactly this sort of introspective judgement. In
particular, I will focus on comparisons of phenomenal experiences of colour,
an issue that has received a good deal of attention in analytic philosophy in
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the past half century or so.
3.1.1 The Phenomenon
A common example involves a subject viewing three colour samples (paint
chips, let us say). The subject is unable to distinguish Sample x from
Sample y, is unable to distinguish Sample y from Sample z, but is able
to distinguish Sample x from Sample z. Examples like this abound in
various contexts. David Armstrong raises it as an objection to ’sensory item’
theories of perception (Armstrong, 1968). Discussions of vagueness use
this phenomenon to treat colours as textbook examples of vague predicates
(Dummett, 1975; Wright, 1975; Williamson, 1994). Closer to home for our
purposes, Goodman considers the example in the context of describing the
conditions for two qualia to be identical (Goodman, 1951).
Interestingly, this is not just a thought experiment. We have data from
actual experiments demonstrating this phenomenon, such as the one de-
scribed by Diana Raffman. Her experiment involved 41 patches of coloured
light arranged in a circle. They were designed to instantiate a phenom-
enal continuum between two noticeably different shades of green. There
were redundancies in the series: roughly every other sample was physically
identical to the preceding sample in the wheel. The starting points were
randomized, and the subjects were asked to compare two neighbouring
samples. If the subject judged them to be the same, they were then asked
to compare the next two samples. The subject was taken around the circle,
judging successive pairs of samples, until they judged two samples to be
different (ie, when they came to the point where they were comparing the
endpoints of the continuum). At that point, the experiment ended. “At
the end of the experiment we asked roughly half of the subjects if they had
noticed any changes in the colors of the patches during the experiment. All
said ‘no’”(Raffman, 2012, p.316). This despite the fact that the entire circle
remained in view for the duration of the experiment.
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3.1.2 Non-transitivity of Indiscriminability
In the literature dealing with pairwise colour discrimination, it is near
orthodoxy to say that indiscriminability is a non-transitive relation. That
is, from the fact that x is indiscriminable from y, and y is indiscriminable
from z, it does not follow that x is indiscriminable from z.4
Goff, of course, is not in a position to follow the orthodox crowd on
this point. For, as we have seen, his position entails that indiscriminability
implies identity. Identity, of course, is transitive. Thus, his treatment of
this phenomenon must preserve transitivity. Without yet having argued
that the revelation thesis is false, I should point out that this is already a
problem for Goff. In his dialectic aim, the revelation thesis was meant to be
an uncontroversial (or, at least, minimally controversial) starting point in
the argument against physicalism. The fact that his thesis entails a minority
position with respect to the transitivity of colour discrimination makes
Goff’s starting point more controversial than he may have intended.
3.1.3 Two Promising Responses
There are some alternative lines of response to the phenomenon described
above that initially appear to offer some resources for Goff to account for it
without jeopardizing the revelation thesis. Delia Graff-Fara describes (but
does not endorse) a response to the phenomenon according to which “for
some sufficiently slight amount of change (in colour, sound, position, etc.),
we cannot perceive an object as having changed by less than that amount
unless we perceive it as not having changed at all (as having changed by
a zero amount)”(Graff, 2001, p.917). Note that Graff-Fara mentions change
three times: the first one is an objective change, but the latter two are
subjective. Insofar as the revelation thesis is concerned with change,5 it is
only concerned with the latter sense. According to this proposal, then, for
4Armstrong, Dummett, Wright, Williamson, and Goodman, mentioned above, all defend
non-transitivity of indiscriminability, as do a number of others. See, for example: (Chuard,
2010; Clark, 1989; Deutsch, 2005; Hellie, 2005; Keefe, 2011; Pelling, 2008)
5Technically, the revelation thesis is not concerned specifically with change so much as
it is concerned with difference in general in this context.
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some sufficiently slight amount of difference in stimulus, our phenomenal
experience represents no difference at all. And if that is correct, then we
can be fallible in a way that is helpful to Goff. Our perception, on this view,
handles difference in discrete jumps. Stimuli that lie within a specific range
will produce the exact same phenomenal experience.
Diana Raffman makes a different suggestion that may also be helpful
for Goff. She suggests that colour perception may be unstable. That is,
for some patch y that is between patches x and z in colour, y may appear
one way when compared with x, and another way when compared with z
(Raffman, 2017).
The question of whether Graff-Fara’s and Raffman’s suggestions are
compatible is an interesting one, but it is not particularly relevant for our
exercise here. What is relevant is that if either (or both) are correct, then
there is a way for Goff to deny both non-transitivity while maintaining that
we are infallible in these contexts. He could respond to the problem as
follows:
Sure, while judging between x and y, the subject is unable to
discriminate. And while judging between y and z, the subject is
unable to discriminate. But this merely shows that the subject’s
experience of y next to x is different from the subject’s experience
of y next to z.
This line of response gains some plausibility from the nature of direct
phenomenal concepts. As Chalmers describes, direct phenomenal concepts
do not last very long. “The lifetime of a direct phenomenal concept is limited
to the lifetime of the experience...that constitutes it. (In some cases a specific
phenomenal concept might persist for a few moments due to the persistence
of a vivid iconic memory, but even this will soon disappear.)” (Chalmers,
2003, p.240). If, in the interval between comparing x with y and y with z
one loses one direct phenomenal concept and forms another, then IIPP is
not in play.
However, this feature of direct phenomenal concepts raises other diffi-
culties for Goff. Note that in Goff’s account, direct phenomenal concepts
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perform a demonstrative role. Recall that the revelation thesis is supposed
to explain super-justification. That is, it is supposed to explain why “even
supposing I am asleep or in the Matrix, it’s hard to dissuade myself of the
evident truth that what it’s like for me to experience that— the left- hand
splodge— is similar to what it’s like for me to experience that— the right-
hand splodge” (Goff, 2017, p.110, emphasis in original). Charlie Pelling
notes a worry about demonstrative concepts that are as short-lived as the
ones we are considering. He cites an example from Wittgenstein: I can’t
demonstrate that I know my height by placing my hand on top of my head
and claiming to be that tall. Rather, he suggests the following constraint for
demonstrative concepts: “to possess a demonstrative concept of a shade
that his experience represents an object to him as having, a subject must
be able to tell, after his experience no longer represents an object to him as
having that shade, whether or not an object is being represented to him in
a new experience as having that shade” (Pelling, 2007, p. 214). If direct
phenomenal concepts must be constrained in this way, then this line of
response is shut off for Goff.
In a similar vein, Poston (2014) questions whether direct phenomenal
beliefs can have the cognitive significance Chalmers and Goff ascribe them.
These beliefs can only persist as long as the direct phenomenal concepts they
employ. But those concepts persist ever so briefly. Poston’s contention is
that if direct phenomenal beliefs are so fleeting, then judgements of identity
similarity and difference are not direct phenomenal beliefs. If this is correct,
then Goff’s example of the judgement that his experience of the left-hand
splodge is similar to his experience of the right-hand splodge is not actually
a direct phenomenal belief.
Another worry for Goff here is raised by Mills. “It is one thing to allow
that a patch may have different apparent colors at different times. It is
quite another to insist that I cannot attend simultaneously to the apparent
colors of all the patches, or at least enough of them—as few as three—to
generate paradox.6 To my knowledge, no empirical evidence supports
6Note that Mills is responding to Sorites style arguments in the literature on vagueness
that reference this phenomenon. Hence his mention of a paradox.
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this strong claim” (Mills, 2002, p. 387-388). If, as Mills suggests, it is
possible to simultaneously attend to three of the patches that generate the
phenomenon described in §3.1.1, then this line of response is unavailable
to Goff. On the other hand, Jackson and Pinkerton have argued that it
is logically impossible for one and the same person to simultaneously be
unable to distinguish x from y and unable to distinguish y from z and able to
distinguish x from z (Jackson & Pinkerton, 1973). They argue that since the
subject can discriminate between x and z, she can then discriminate between
x and y by noting that x is discriminable from z, but y is not. However, this
argument involves both phenomenal experience and a subject’s making
further judgements about phenomenal experience. Since the revelation
thesis is a claim about what can be known directly from introspection, it
seems to me that Jackson and Pinkerton’s argument is not an adequate
response for Goff to Mills’ worry.
Laying these worries aside, let us grant Goff this line of response. Let
us allow that the phenomenon of colour discrimination is not a problem for
IIPP insofar as it is presented as a diachronic problem. As it happens, there
is a less tractable problem for IIPP lurking in the nearby bushes.
3.2 Phenomenal Continua
3.2.1 The Phenomenon
Yesterday evening I enjoyed watching the sunset. At the top of my field
of vision, the sky appeared a deep blue. At the bottom, it appeared a
golden yellow. In between these two end-points was a perfectly smooth
transition from blue to yellow. I was able to discriminate between the blue
phenomenal experience at the top of my field of vision, and the yellow at
the bottom. However, there were no discriminable boundaries between the
hues that composed my visual field.
If IIPP were correct, then (given Goff’s view of direct phenomenal con-
cepts) this should not be possible. Recall that a corollary of IIPP was that
there are no indiscriminable differences with respect to direct phenomenal
concepts. What this corollary predicts is that there be discrete bands of
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colour in my experience of the sunset. Without indiscriminable differences,
my experience of a sunset should perhaps be similar in effect to my expe-
rience of a rainbow. Why suppose that this is what is predicted by IIPP?
Consider that I could pick out a finite number of hues in my field of vision.
By my lights, I perceived something between 5 and 10 hues.7 If I can’t detect
the boundaries between these hues, then I can’t tell where my experience of
one hue ends and my experience of the next hue begins. And if I can’t tell
that, then there are indiscriminable differences at the boundaries between
hues.
In fact, I was unable to detect the boundaries between the various hues
I discerned. Thus, there were indiscriminable differences. And therefore,
IIPP is false.
3.2.2 Responses to the Phenomenon
Crispin Wright presents a similar argument to this one in his case for the
non-transitivity of colour discrimination (Wright, 1975). But, as we have
seen above, that conclusion is at odds with IIPP. So, Wright’s approach is of
no help to the revelation thesis.
In response to Wright, Graff-Fara appeals to fallibilism. First, she notes
that her version of fallibilism laid out above in §3.1.4 implies non-transitivity
if phenomenal continua are possible. So, that version of fallibilism is no
help for the revelation thesis here. She then introduces a different version of
fallibilism that allows her to endorse transitivity. This version involves the
claim that there is a distinction between how things look to a subject, and
how the subject notices that they look. Notice that this version of fallibilism
is at odds with the revelation thesis, since both “how things look” and
“how the subject notices they look” are both on the subjective side of the
objective/subjective divide. By the revelation thesis, things on the subjective
side are “known with rational certainty (or something close to it)”. That
is, there is no difference between “how things look” and “how the subject
7The fact that I am not sure how many is itself a problem for the revelation thesis.
Shouldn’t I know with “rational certainty” exactly how many hues composed this phenom-
enal experience?
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notices they look”, at least while the subject is attending to how things
look. Graff-Fara summarizes: “Can we be sure, when looking at a colour
spectrum, that it does not really look to change discontinuously from red
on the left to yellow on the right? Can we be sure that the spectrum does
not really look to contain, at certain points, discrete but barely noticeable
changes in colour? I do not see that we can be at all sure of these things”
(Graff, 2001, p.922). Clearly this approach is of no help for the revelation
thesis. The revelation thesis entails that if it did look to us that there were
discrete but barely noticeable changes in a colour spectrum, we would know
with rational certainty that it looked to us that way.
Note also that the appeal to the short life-span of direct phenomenal
concepts is of no help here, either. My experience of the phenomenal
continuum in viewing the sunset was synchronic. All of the relevant direct
phenomenal concepts were based on attending to the same experience.
Thus, they were all alive simultaneously and throughout the duration of
my attention to the experience.
The synchronic phenomenon of colour discrimination is thus a less
tractable problem for the revelation thesis than the diachronic problem. The
responses that showed some promise for the latter (controversial though
they were), are of no help for the former.
Conclusion
I conclude, then, that IIPP is false. Even if IIPP can stand in the face of the
diachronic problem posed by pairwise colour matching, it cannot stand in
the face of the existence of phenomenal continua. IIPP has the virtue of
making falsifiable predictions about our phenomenal experience. Unfortu-
nately for IIPP, those predictions are in fact falsified by our experience of
phenomenal continua. Since IIPP is entailed by Goff’s revelation thesis, we
can infer by contraposition that it, too, is false. This leaves Goff’s direct
phenomenal transparency thesis without a defence.
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